The accomplishment of plans: a new version of the principle of double effect

Philosophical Studies 165 (1):49-69 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The classical principle of double effect offers permissibility conditions for actions foreseen to lead to evil outcomes. I shall argue that certain kinds of closeness cases, as well as general heuristic considerations about the order of explanation, lead us to replace the intensional concept of intention with the extensional concept of accomplishment in double effect

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,596

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2012-04-17

Downloads
183 (#128,218)

6 months
13 (#213,057)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology.Eric Todd Olson - 1997 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.

View all 25 references / Add more references