The cardinality objection to David Lewis's modal realism

Philosophical Studies 104 (2):169-178 (2001)
Abstract
According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every waythat a world could be is a way that some concretely existingphysical world really is. But if the worlds are physicalentities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereasI show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is nota set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of theLewisian framework.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010304927119
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 32,688
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Omnipotence and Other Possibilities.Martin Lembke - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (4):425 - 443.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Branching Versus Divergent Possible Worlds.Jiri Benovsky - 2005 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 19 (1):12-20.
Lycan on Lewis and Meinong.Peter J. King - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93:193 - 201.
Possible Worlds I: Modal Realism.Louis deRosset - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (6):998-1008.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
108 ( #53,714 of 2,237,247 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #42,562 of 2,237,247 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature