The cardinality objection to David Lewis's modal realism

Philosophical Studies 104 (2):169-178 (2001)
According to David Lewis's extreme modal realism, every waythat a world could be is a way that some concretely existingphysical world really is. But if the worlds are physicalentities, then there should be a set of all worlds, whereasI show that in fact the collection of all possible worlds is nota set. The latter conclusion remains true even outside of theLewisian framework.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010304927119
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What is the Principle of Recombination?David Efird - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):483-494.
Omnipotence and Other Possibilities.Martin Lembke - 2012 - Religious Studies 48 (4):425 - 443.

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