In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 177--200 (2007)

James Pryor
New York University
(revisions posted 12/5/2006) to appear in Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology, ed. by Sanford Goldberg (to be published by Oxford in 2006 or 2007) Michael McKinsey formulated an argument that raises a puzzle about the relation between externalism about content and our introspective awareness of content. The puzzle goes like this: it seems like I can know the contents of my thoughts by introspection alone; but philosophical reflection tells me that the contents of those thoughts are externalist, and so I couldn
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.

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Citations of this work BETA

Externalism About Mental Content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Hyper-Reliability and Apriority.James Pryor - 2006 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3):327–344.
Recent Work on McKinsey's Paradox.J. Kallestrup - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):157-171.

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