Reasons and that‐clauses

Philosophical Issues 17 (1):217-244 (2007)
What are reasons? For example, if you’re aware that your secretary plans to expose you, and you resign to avoid a scandal, what is your reason for resigning? Is your reason the fact that your secretary plans to expose you? If so, what kinds of facts are eligible to be reasons? Can merely possible facts be reasons (for actual subjects)? Can merely apparent facts? Or are reasons rather attitudes? Are your reasons for resigning your belief that your secretary plans to expose you, and your desire to avoid a scandal? Or are reasons propositions? If so, which propositions? Only propositions that the subject believes and desires? Only propositions that are true? (On some views, those will be facts; on other views, not.).
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2007.00131.x
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Kurt Sylvan (2016). Epistemic Reasons II: Basing. Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.

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