Noûs 34 (4):517–549 (2000)

Authors
James Pryor
New York University
Abstract
Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute this, but I do not. The skeptic I want to consider goes beyond these familiar points to the much more radical conclusion that our perceptual experiences can’t give us any knowledge or even justification for believing that our surroundings are one way rather than another.
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00277
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References found in this work BETA

The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Naming and Necessity.Saul A. Kripke - 1985 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Content Preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.
No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University

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