The skeptic and the dogmatist

Noûs 34 (4):517–549 (2000)
Abstract
Consider the skeptic about the external world. Let’s straightaway concede to such a skeptic that perception gives us no conclusive or certain knowledge about our surroundings. Our perceptual justification for beliefs about our surroundings is always defeasible—there are always possible improvements in our epistemic state which would no longer support those beliefs. Let’s also concede to the skeptic that it’s metaphysically possible for us to have all the experiences we’re now having while all those experiences are false. Some philosophers dispute this, but I do not. The skeptic I want to consider goes beyond these familiar points to the much more radical conclusion that our perceptual experiences can’t give us any knowledge or even justification for believing that our surroundings are one way rather than another.
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DOI 10.1111/0029-4624.00277
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Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge.Stewart Cohen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):309-329.
On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.

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