What's wrong with Moore's argument?

Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378 (2004)

Authors
James Pryor
New York University
Abstract
Something about this argument sounds funny. As we’ll see, though, it takes some care to identify exactly what Moore has done wrong. Iwill assume that Moore knows premise (2) to be true. One could inquire into how he knows it, and whether that knowledge can be defeated; but Iwon’t. I’ll focus instead on what epistemic relations Moore has to premise (1) and to his conclusion (3). It may matter which epistemic relations we choose to consider. Some philosophers will diagnose Moore’s argument using Contextualist machinery. They’ll say.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2004.00034.x
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References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Practical Reality.Jonathan Dancy - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
Problems for Dogmatism.Roger White - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):525-557.

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