Percepcja wartości w etyce G.E. Moore’a

Etyka 31:125-144 (1998)
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Abstract

The aim of the present article is to reconstruct the theory of the moral perception held by G.E. Moore, with a special regard to its ontological and epistemological features. The author tries to prove first that Moore’s theory of ethical reality has been strongly influenced by his ontology and epistemology. Secondly, he indicates that the two mentioned views are interdependent ones. However the article is intended not only to give an account of the doctrine of Moore but also to be a particular interpretation of it. A discerning analysis of Moore’s act of the moral perception shows that he understood it on the analogy with the sense perception. The author tries therefore to interpret the theory of the moral perception in the sense-data language.

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