There has been no shortage of such conceptual analyses and no shortage of counterexamples to all of them. The counterexamples exploit, at least partly, situations in which we are presumed to have clear intuitions about what causes what, but which intuitions are not being respected by the suggested philosophical analysis. The counterexamples typically lead to a battery of sophisticated attempts to revise or amend the philosophical analysis so that it is saved from refutation. These attempts, typically, either deny the intuitions on which the counterexamples are based or accommodate the problematic cases within the theory by adding further clauses to the original philosophical analysis. The result of all this is that where the original philosophical theory rested on a simple, forceful and intuitively plausible idea (e.g., that causation consists in a relation of counterfactual dependence between discrete events), the modified philosophical theory becomes very convoluted, somewhat ad hoc and implausible
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Disposition, Explanation, and Causation—A Defense of the Reformed Conditional Analysis of Disposition.Jaeho Lee - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (3):569-577.
Counterfactuals and Event Causation.Charles B. Cross - 1992 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3):307 – 323.
Causation in the Social Sciences: Evidence, Inference, and Purpose.Julian Reiss - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (1):20-40.
Dis-Unified Pluralist Accounts of Causation.Jason Taylor - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (3):388-401.
Counterexamples to Nozick's Account of Transmission of Knowledge Via Proof.Adam Thompson - 1986 - Philosophy Research Archives 12:261-265.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #103,758 of 2,163,972 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,913 of 2,163,972 )
How can I increase my downloads?