Causal Pluralism()

Abstract
There has been no shortage of such conceptual analyses and no shortage of counterexamples to all of them. The counterexamples exploit, at least partly, situations in which we are presumed to have clear intuitions about what causes what, but which intuitions are not being respected by the suggested philosophical analysis. The counterexamples typically lead to a battery of sophisticated attempts to revise or amend the philosophical analysis so that it is saved from refutation. These attempts, typically, either deny the intuitions on which the counterexamples are based or accommodate the problematic cases within the theory by adding further clauses to the original philosophical analysis. The result of all this is that where the original philosophical theory rested on a simple, forceful and intuitively plausible idea (e.g., that causation consists in a relation of counterfactual dependence between discrete events), the modified philosophical theory becomes very convoluted, somewhat ad hoc and implausible
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How Can Causal Explanations Explain?Jon Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):257-275.

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