Greece

Abstract

1. I have argued in my (1999, chapter 4) that the no-miracles argument (NMA) should be seen as a grand IBE. The way I read it, NMA is a philosophical argument which aims to defend the reliability of scientific methodology in producing approximately true theories. More specifically, I took it that NMA is a two-part (or two-stage) argument. Here is its structure.

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Stathis Psillos
University of Athens

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