Stathis Psillos
University of Athens
Among the many issues that relate to the role of Reason in science, I will focus my attention on two. The first concerns the problem of the justification of scientific method—and of induction in particular, which is the most basic and indispensable ampliative method of science. The second is related to the problem of theory-change in science: how can it be that theory-change is rational? In addressing these two issues (highlighting both their conceptual development and their present status), I will try to stress the need for a conception of method and rationality that leaves room for values.
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