Scientific realism and metaphysics

Ratio 18 (4):385–404 (2005)

Authors
Stathis Psillos
University of Athens
Abstract
When we think of scientific realism, there seem to be to ways to conceive of what it is about. The first is to see it as a view about scientific theories; the second is to see it as a view about the world. Some philosophers, most typically from Australia, think that the second way is the correct way. Scientific realism, they argue, is a metaphysical thesis: it asserts the reality of some types of entity, most typically, unobservable entities. I agree that scientific realism has a metaphysical dimension, but I have insisted that it has other dimensions too. In my (1999), I took scientific realism to consist of three theses (or stances).
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00301.x
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Perception and Reality.Wilfrid Sellars - 1963 - New York: Humanities Press.
Physical Realism.Brian Ellis - 2005 - Ratio 18 (4):371–384.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explanation and Explanationism in Science and Metaphysics.Juha Saatsi - forthcoming - In Matthew Slater & Zanja Yudell (eds.), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays. Oxford University Press.

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