Abstract

A persistent worry in the ethical literature on care and empathy is that the agent is prone to self-sacrifice by the requisite state of engrossment in or engagement of the other. Addressing this worry particularly as expressed in feminist philosophy, I argue that the standard conceptions of self-sacrifice conflate four distinct relations of the self to its autonomous will: self-immolation (destroying one’s own autonomy), self-abnegation (disowning one’s autonomy), self-effacement (devaluing one’s autonomy) and self-donation (dedicating one’s autonomy). The latter, far from being vicious, is from an ethical standpoint the highest realization of autonomy; this claim finds echoes in Robin Dillon’s work on self-respect as well as the personalist philosophy of John Paul II. Self-immolation, self-abnegation, and self-effacement, on the other hand, are characterized by detachment from responsibility, corruption of the boundaries between self and other, and suppression of self-understanding.