Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2020)

Authors
Jonathan Pugh
Oxford University
Abstract
Personal autonomy is often lauded as a key value in contemporary Western bioethics. Though the claim that there is an important relationship between autonomy and rationality is often treated as uncontroversial in this sphere, there is also considerable disagreement about how we should cash out the relationship. In particular, it is unclear whether a rationalist view of autonomy can be compatible with legal judgments that enshrine a patient's right to refuse medical treatment, regardless of whether the reasons underpinning the choice are known and rational, or indeed whether they even exist. Jonathan Pugh brings recent philosophical work on the nature of rationality to bear on the question of how we should understand personal autonomy in contemporary bioethics. In doing so, he develops a new framework for thinking about the concept of autonomy, one that is grounded in an understanding of the different roles that rational beliefs and rational desires have to play in it. Pugh's account allows for a deeper understanding of d the relationship between our freedom to act and our capacity to decide autonomously. His rationalist perspective is contrasted with other prominent accounts of autonomy in bioethics, and the revisionary implications it has for practical questions in biomedicine are also outlined.
Keywords Autonomy  Rationality  Consent  Medical Ethics  Bioethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
Buy this book $32.74 used (59% off)   $68.17 new (15% off)   Amazon page
ISBN(s) 0198858582   9780198858584
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 62,268
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
The Possibility of Practical Reason.David Velleman - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Free Agency.Gary Watson - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (April):205-20.

View all 174 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Autonomy, Consent and the Law.Sheila McLean - 2010 - Routledge-Cavendish.
The Evolution of Autonomy.Trevor Stammers - 2015 - The New Bioethics 21 (2):155-163.
Reconceptualizing Autonomy for Bioethics.Lisa Dive & Ainsley J. Newson - 2018 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 28 (2):171-203.
Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics.Onora O'Neill - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.
Autonomy.Bruce Jennings - 2009 - In Bonnie Steinbock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Bioethics. Oxford University Press.
Autonomy in Bioethics.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (2): 177-190.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-04-07

Total views
33 ( #326,938 of 2,444,893 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #57,029 of 2,444,893 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes