Philosophy and Public Affairs 44 (1):77-95 (2016)

Authors
Theron Pummer
University of St. Andrews
Abstract
Effective altruists recommend that we give large sums to charity, but by far their more central message is that we give effectively, i.e., to whatever charities would do the most good per dollar donated. In this paper, I’ll assume that it’s not wrong not to give bigger, but will explore to what extent it may well nonetheless be wrong not to give better. The main claim I’ll argue for here is that in many cases it would be wrong of you to give a sum of money to charities that do less good than others you could have given to instead, even if it would not have been wrong of you not to give the money to any charity at all. I assume that all the charities under discussion here do positive good overall, do not cause harm, do not infringe rights, etc. What makes my main claim here particularly interesting is that it is inconsistent with what appears to be a fairly common assumption in the ethics of giving, according to which if it is not wrong of you to keep some sum of money for yourself, then it is likewise not wrong of you to donate it to any particular charity you choose. Roughly: if it’s up to you whether to donate the money, it’s also up to you where to donate the money. I challenge this common assumption.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2018
DOI 10.1111/papa.12065
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (3):229-243.
Famine, Affluence, and Morality.Peter Singer - 1972 - Oxford University Press USA.
Conditional Obligations.Tina Rulli - 2020 - Social Theory and Practice 46 (2):365-390.
Future Generations: Further Problems.Derek Parfit - 1982 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (2):113-172.
The Demands of Beneficence.Liam B. Murphy - 1993 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (4):267-292.

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options.Douglas W. Portmore - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
Infinite Aggregation and Risk.Hayden Wilkinson - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

View all 36 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Miracles Old and New.Diogenes Allen - 1974 - Interpretation 28 (3):298-306.
We Make a Life by What We Give.Richard B. Gunderman - 2008 - Indiana University Press.
The Worseness of Nonexistence.Theron Pummer - 2019 - In Espen Gamlund and Carl Tollef Solberg (ed.), Saving People from the Harm of Death. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-228.
Pascal's Mugging.Nick Bostrom - 2009 - Analysis 69 (3):443-445.
Laplace Type Operators: Dirichlet Problem.Wojciech Kozłowski - 2007 - Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa- Classe di Scienze 6 (1):53-80.
Equality, Priority, and Compassion.Roger Crisp - 2003 - Ethics 113 (4):745-763.
Objective and Cognitive Context.Carlo Penco - 1999 - In P. Brezillon & P. Bouquet (eds.), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence. Springer.
Quelques Précisions Sur la D.O.P. Et la Profondeur d'Une Theorie.D. Lascar - 1985 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (2):316-330.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-08-22

Total views
842 ( #7,001 of 2,454,643 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
73 ( #9,514 of 2,454,643 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes