Consent by residence: A defense

European Journal of Political Theory 20 (3):529-546 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The traditional view according to which we adults tacitly consent to a state’s lawful actions just by living within its borders—the residence theory—is now widely rejected by political philosophers. According to the critics, this theory fails because consent must be (i) intentional, (ii) informed, and (iii) voluntary, whereas one’s continued residence within a state is typically none of these things. Few people intend to remain within the state in which they find themselves, and few realize that by remaining they are consenting to the state’s lawful actions. In addition, the various obstacles standing in the way of us leaving the state render our remaining involuntary. Thus, the critics conclude, few if any people can be considered to have consented through their residence. I argue that these objections fail and that the residence theory remains a viable option, at least for those who are not committed incompatibilists.

Similar books and articles

Tacit Consent Without Political Obligation.James Furner - 2010 - Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 57 (124):54-85.
Consent and Its Cousins.William A. Edmundson - 2011 - Ethics 121 (2):335-53.
The Authority of the State.Leslie Green - 1988 - Clarendon Press.
John Locke's Contractarian Theory of Political Obligation.Yoen-kyo Jung - 1992 - Dissertation, The University of Rochester
Unintentional Consent.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2015 - Kritike 9 (1):86-95.
Hobbes on Tacit Covenants.Mark C. Murphy - 1994 - Hobbes Studies 7 (1):69-94.
Locke, Simmons, and Consent.Michael Davis - 2017 - Social Theory and Practice 43 (4):667-690.
What is the Basis of Political Authority?Harry Beran - 1983 - The Monist 66 (4):487-499.
Obligation and Consent - II.Hannah Pitkin - 1966 - American Political Science Review 60:39-52.
Locke’s Social Theory: Contract or Consent?Maryam Lārijāni - 2008 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 9 (36):147-178.
Normative Consent and Authority.Daniel Koltonski - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (3):255-275.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-02-24

Downloads
207 (#59,170)

6 months
50 (#18,538)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Puryear
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations