Authors
Stephen Puryear
North Carolina State University
Abstract
Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities
Keywords Leibniz  color  sensible qualities  qualities  subjectivism  objectivism  physicalism  secondary qualities
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00503.x
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References found in this work BETA

How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.

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Citations of this work BETA

Reflection, Intelligibility, and Leibniz’s Case Against Materialism.Julia Borcherding - 2018 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 21 (1):44-68.
Leibniz on Sensation and the Limits of Reason.Walter Ott - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (2):135-153.

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