Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color

Authors
Stephen Puryear
North Carolina State University
Abstract
Drawing on remarks scattered through his writings, I argue that Leibniz has a highly distinctive and interesting theory of color. The central feature of the theory is the way in which it combines a nuanced subjectivism about color with a reductive approach of a sort usually associated with objectivist theories of color. After reconstructing Leibniz's theory and calling attention to some of its most notable attractions, I turn to the apparent incompatibility of its subjective and reductive components. I argue that this apparent tension vanishes in light of his rejection of a widely accepted doctrine concerning the nature of bodies and their geometrical qualities
Keywords Leibniz  color  sensible qualities  qualities  subjectivism  objectivism  physicalism  secondary qualities
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00503.x
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How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Berkeley on the Mind-Dependence of Colors.Margaret D. Wilson - 1987 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 68 (3/4):249.

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