Motion in Leibniz's Middle Years: A Compatibilist Approach

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 6:135-170 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the texts of the middle years (roughly, the 1680s and 90s), Leibniz appears to endorse two incompatible approaches to motion, one a realist approach, the other a phenomenalist approach. I argue that once we attend to certain nuances in his account we can see that in fact he has only one, coherent approach to motion during this period. I conclude by considering whether the view of motion I want to impute to Leibniz during his middle years ranks as a kind of realism or rather as some kind of phenomenalism or idealism.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-04-13

Downloads
591 (#33,198)

6 months
92 (#64,577)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Puryear
North Carolina State University

Citations of this work

Leibniz on the Metaphysics of Color.Stephen Puryear - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):319-346.
Force, Motion, and Leibniz’s Argument from Successiveness.Peter Myrdal - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (4):704-729.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Leibniz: Body, Substance, Monad.Daniel Garber - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Leibniz: determinist, theist, idealist.Adams Robert Merrihew - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Leibniz: an introduction.C. D. Broad - 1975 - London: Cambridge University Press.
Space and relativity in Newton and Leibniz.Richard Arthur - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):219-240.

View all 10 references / Add more references