Against explanationist skepticism regarding philosophical intuitions

Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258 (2001)
Abstract
Though most of analytic philosophy is based upon intuitions, some philosophers are beginning to question whether intuitions are an appropriate basis for philosophical theory. This paper responds to the arguments of some contemporary philosophers who hold that intuitions should not be treated as evidence for anything other than our contingent psychological constitution. It begins with a demonstration that skeptical arguments by Gilbert Harman and Alvin Goldman are variations on an argument with the potential to undermine the use of intuitions in much philosophical inquiry. After a demonstration that Nicholas Sturgeon’s response to Harman’s argument is inadequate, it argues that all of the instances of the skeptical argument are unsuccessful because they are epistemically self-defeating.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy of Mind   Philosophy of Religion
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1013356707899
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The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Epistemic Intuitions.Jennifer Nagel - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.
Surveying Philosophers About Philosophical Intuition.J. R. Kuntz & J. R. C. Kuntz - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (4):643-665.

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