Beauty and Generalized Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani

Erkenntnis 79 (3):687-700 (2014)
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Abstract

Horgan and Mahtani (Erkenntnis 78: 333–351, 2013) present a new argument for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem resting on a principle for updating probabilities which they call “generalized conditionalization.” They allege that this new argument is immune to two attacks which have been recently leveled at other arguments for thirdism. I argue that their new argument rests on a probability distribution which is (a) no more justified than an alternative distribution favoring a different answer to the problem, and (b) ultimately unjustified. I go on to show that generalized conditionalization cannot be applied in the manner suggested, given the cogency of the aforementioned attacks on thirder arguments. Hence, the new argument fails to advance the case for the 1/3 answer

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Joel Pust
University of Delaware

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Existential Bias.Casper Storm Hansen - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):701-721.

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