Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence
Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):295-315 (2012)
| Abstract |
One can have no prior credence whatsoever (not even zero) in a temporally indexical claim. This fact saves the principle of conditionalization from potential counterexample and undermines the Elga and Arntzenius/Dorr arguments for the thirder position and Lewis' argument for the halfer position on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, thereby supporting the double-halfer position.
|
| Keywords | Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy |
| Categories | (categorize this paper) |
| ISBN(s) | 0022-362X |
| DOI | 10.5840/jphil2012109411 |
| Options |
Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
|
Download optionsOur Archive
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy Papers currently archived: 32,678
External links
- From the Publisher via CrossRef (no proxy)
- udel.edu
(no proxy) - pdcnet.org (no proxy)
- pdcnet.org [2] (no proxy)
- pdcnet.org [3] (no proxy)
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
- Sign in / register and customize your OpenURL resolver..
- Configure custom resolver
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1003-1017.
Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan.Joel Pust - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.
The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information.Kai Draper - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202.
Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
View all 9 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articlesGeneralized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Everettian Confirmation and Sleeping Beauty.Alastair Wilson - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (3):axt018.
An Embarrassment for Double-Halfers.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):146-151.
Sleeping Beauty, Evidential Support and Indexical Knowledge: Reply to Horgan.Joel Pust - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1489-1501.
Added to PP index
2010-09-09
Total downloads
227 ( #20,176 of 2,236,881 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #42,562 of 2,236,881 )
2010-09-09
Total downloads
227 ( #20,176 of 2,236,881 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
11 ( #42,562 of 2,236,881 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads
My notes
