Conditionalization and Essentially Indexical Credence

Journal of Philosophy 109 (4):295-315 (2012)
Authors
Joel Pust
University of Delaware
Abstract
One can have no prior credence whatsoever (not even zero) in a temporally indexical claim. This fact saves the principle of conditionalization from potential counterexample and undermines the Elga and Arntzenius/Dorr arguments for the thirder position and Lewis' argument for the halfer position on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, thereby supporting the double-halfer position.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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ISBN(s) 0022-362X
DOI 10.5840/jphil2012109411
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Beauty, Odds, and Credence.Masahiro Yamada - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.
The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information.Kai Draper - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202.

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