Dutch Books and Logical Form

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):961-970 (2021)
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Dutch Book Arguments (DBAs) have been invoked to support various requirements of rationality. Some are plausible: probabilism and conditionalization. Others are less so: credal transparency and reflection. Anna Mahtani has argued for a new understanding of DBAs which, she claims, allow us to keep the DBAs for probabilism (and perhaps conditionalization) and reject the DBAs for credal transparency and reflection. I argue that Mahtani’s new account fails as (a) it does not support highly plausible requirements of rational coherence and (b) it does not, even setting aside the first objection, succeed in undermining the DBAs for credal transparency or reflection.

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Joel Pust
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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A dilemma for subjective bayesians — and how to resolve it.Peter Milne - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (3):307 - 314.

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