Horgan on sleeping beauty

Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101 (2007)
Abstract
With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
Keywords Sleeping Beauty problem  Epistemic probability  Terence Horgan
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Reprint years 2008
DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9102-4
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References found in this work BETA
Theory and Evidence.Clark Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.
Sleeping Beauty: Reply to Elga.David Lewis - 2001 - Analysis 61 (3):171–76.
Sleeping Beauty: In Defence of Elga.Cian Dorr - 2002 - Analysis 62 (4):292–296.

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Citations of this work BETA
Inertia, Optimism and Beauty.Patrick Hawley - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):85-103.
The Evidential Relevance of Self-Locating Information.Kai Draper - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):185-202.

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