This book is concerned with the role of intuitions in the justification of philosophical theory. The author begins by demonstrating how contemporary philosophers, whether engaged in case-driven analysis or seeking reflective equilibrium, rely on intuitions as evidence for their theories. The author then provides an account of the nature of philosophical intuitions and distinguishes them from other psychological states. Finally, the author defends the use of intuitions as evidence by demonstrating that arguments for skepticism about their evidential value are either self-defeating or guilty of arbitrary and unjustified partiality towards non-intuitive modes of knowledge.
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$144.53 new (4% off) $150.00 direct from Amazon $333.61 used Amazon page|
|Call number||BD181.P87 2000|
|ISBN(s)||0815337639 9780815337638 9780203824122 9781138992658|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.
The Philosophical Personality Argument.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference.Max Deutsch - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):445-466.
Similar books and articles
Whose Concepts Are They, Anyway? The Role of Philosophical Intuition in Empirical Psychology.Alison Gopnik & Eric Schwitzgebel - 1998 - In M. R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 75--91.
Intuitions Are Inclinations to Believe.Joshua Earlenbaugh & Bernard Molyneux - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (1):89 - 109.
Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions.Joel Pust - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.
Can Modal Intuitions Be Evidence for Essentialist Claims?Janet Levin - 2007 - Inquiry 50 (3):253 – 269.
Problems with the Appeal to Intuition in Epistemology.Adam Feltz - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (2):131 – 141.
Intuitions in Linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts?Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads232 ( #14,445 of 2,146,377 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #27,747 of 2,146,377 )
How can I increase my downloads?
There are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.