On explaining knowledge of necessity

Dialectica 58 (1):71–87 (2004)
Moderate rationalists maintain that our rational intuitions provide us with prima facie justification for believing various necessary propositions. Such a claim is often criticized on the grounds that our having reliable rational intuitions about domains in which the truths are necessary is inexplicable in some epistemically objectionable sense. In this paper, I defend moderate rationalism against such criticism. I argue that if the reliability of our rational intuitions is taken to be contingent, then there is no reason to think that our reliability is inexplicable. I also suggest that our reliability is, in fact, necessary, and that such necessary reliability neither admits of, nor requires, any explanation of the envisaged sort.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2004.tb00292.x
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References found in this work BETA
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
In Defense of Pure Reason.Laurence BonJour - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Mathematical Truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
The Last Word.Thomas Nagel - 1997 - Oup Usa.

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Some Hope for Intuitions: A Reply to Weinberg.Thomas Grundmann - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):481-509.

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