Skepticism, Reason and Reidianism

In Albert Casullo & Joshua Thurow (eds.), The A Priori in Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 205 (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The traditional problems of epistemology have often been thought to be properly solved only by the provision of an argument, with premises justified by rational intuition and introspection, for the probable truth of our beliefs in the problematic domains. Following the lead of Thomas Reid, a sizable number of contemporary epistemologists, including many proponents of so-called "Reformed epistemology" regarding religious belief, reject as arbitrary the preferential treatment of reason and introspection implicit in the traditional view of the problems. These "Reidians" insist that the traditional problems cannot be solved in the expected manner, but they go on to suggest that this result is of little significance because similar skeptical questions can be raised regarding a priori and introspective justification. After making clear the significance of the Reidian objection, I endeavor to defend the traditional preference for rational intuition over our other sources of belief by demonstrating that the usual skeptical worries cannot be equally raised against a priori justification. Then, after a brief consideration of some unduly neglected passages in Reid's writings in which he appears to concede that the traditional partiality to reason and introspection is not, in fact, arbitrary, I argue that it is the Reidians who are guilty of arbitrary partiality.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.
A new argument for skepticism.Baron Reed - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):91 - 104.
Reidianism in Contemporary English-Speaking Religious Epistemology.Peter Byrne - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):267 - 284.
Skepticism about practical reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):5-25.
Introspection and its objects.Denis G. Arnold - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22 (April):87-94.
Introspection and inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.
Intuitions as evidence.Joel Pust - 2000 - New York: Garland.
The knower, inside and out.Steven Luper-Foy - 1988 - Synthese 74 (3):349-67.
Truth as the aim of epistemic justification.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
The Impossibility of Skepticism.Daniel Greco - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):317-358.


Added to PP

126 (#139,254)

6 months
6 (#431,022)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joel Pust
University of Delaware

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references