Warrant and analysis

Analysis 60 (1):51–57 (2000)
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Abstract

Alvin Plantinga theorizes about an epistemic property he calls "warrant," defined as that which makes the difference "between knowledge and mere true belief." I show that, given this account, Plantinga can have no justification for claiming that a false belief is warranted nor for claiming that warrant comes in degrees.

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Joel Pust
University of Delaware

Citations of this work

Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.
Warrant is unique.Andrew M. Bailey - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):297-304.

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