Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):699-711 (1973)
UNCLEAR as it is, the traditional doctrine that the notion "meaning" possesses the extension/intension ambiguity has certain typical consequences. The doctrine that the meaning of a term is a concept carried the implication that mean- ings are mental entities. Frege, however, rebelled against this "psy- chologism." Feeling that meanings are public property-that the same meaning can be "grasped" by more than one person and by persons at different times-he identified concepts (and hence "intensions" or meanings) with abstract entities rather than mental entities. However, "grasping" these abstract entities was still an individual psychological act. None of these philosophers doubted that understanding a word (knowing its intension) was just a matter of being in a certain psychological state (somewhat in the way in which knowing how to factor numbers in one's head is just a mat- ter of being in a certain very complex psychological state)
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Notions of Necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.
Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content.Jeff Speaks - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):539-573.
One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism Without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism.Gabriele Contessa - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):199-221.
Similar books and articles
Can Theories of Meaning and Reference Solve the Problem of Legal Determinacy?Brian Bix - 2003 - Ratio Juris 16 (3):281-295.
Reference and the Permutation Argument.Richard Gaskin - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):295-309.
Spencerism and the Causal Theory of Reference.W. Hinzen - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (1):71-94.
Sense, Reference and Purported Reference.H. G. Callaway - 1982 - Logique Et Analyse 25 (March):93-103.
Apriorism in the Philosophy of Language.Michael McKinsey - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (July):1-32.
Reference, Knowledge, and Scepticism About Meaning.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2007 - Sorites (19):1-18.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads326 ( #8,502 of 2,154,065 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #36,275 of 2,154,065 )
How can I increase my downloads?