Skepticism, Stroud and the contextuality of knowledge

Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):2 – 16 (2001)
This paper responds to Stroud's important The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism. The author defends a view in which statements in a natural language have truth-evaluable content only in concrete contexts. It is argued that just what counts as a concrete possibility that must be defeated before one can say that one knows something is a highly context-sensitive matter, and that Stroud's alternative to this context-sensitive account of the way the verb "know" functions seems to be either a semantics in which knowledge claims (about the "external world") are trivially logically false or no intelligible semantics at all.
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DOI 10.1080/13869790108523339
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David Lewis (1979). Scorekeeping in a Language Game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.

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