Belief system foundations of backward induction

Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403 (2002)
Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.
Keywords Backward induction  Bonanno's belief systems  Perfect information game  Rationality
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1023/A:1024102216631
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 28,756
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information.Thorsten Clausing - 2004 - Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
Doxastic Conditions for Backward Induction.Thorsten Clausing - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (4):315-336.
The Backward Induction Argument.John W. Carroll - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
Agent Connectedness and Backward Induction.Christian W. Bach & Conrad Heilmann - 2011 - International Game Theory Review 13 (2):195-208.
Common Knowledge of Rationality in Extensive Games.Boudewijn de Bruin - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (3):261-280.
Belief Revision in Games: Forward and Backward Induction.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Mathematical Social Sciences 36 (1):31 - 56.
Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge.Cristina Bicchieri - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

29 ( #178,768 of 2,177,988 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #73,516 of 2,177,988 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums