Belief system foundations of backward induction

Theory and Decision 53 (4):393-403 (2002)
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Abstract

Two justifications of backward induction (BI) in generic perfect information games are formulated using Bonanno's (1992; Theory and Decision 33, 153) belief systems. The first justification concerns the BI strategy profile and is based on selecting a set of rational belief systems from which players have to choose their belief functions. The second justification concerns the BI path of play and is based on a sequential deletion of nodes that are inconsistent with the choice of rational belief functions.

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References found in this work

Modeling Rational Players: Part I.Ken Binmore - 1987 - Economics and Philosophy 3 (2):179-214.
The chain store paradox.Reinhard Selten - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (2):127-159.
Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction.Robert Stalnaker - 1998 - Mathematical Social Sciences 36 (1):31 - 56.
Game-theoretic axioms for local rationality and bounded knowledge.Gian Aldo Antonelli & Cristina Bicchieri - 1995 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.

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