Against dispositionalism: belief in cognitive science

Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372 (2018)
Authors
Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Oxford University
Abstract
Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.
Keywords Belief  Dispositionalism  Representation  Dissonance  Bias  Inference
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.

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Citations of this work BETA

Interpretivism and Norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
Beliefs as Inner Causes: The (Lack of) Evidence.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):850-877.

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