Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2353-2372 (2018)

Authors
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Washington University in St. Louis
Eric Mandelbaum
CUNY Graduate Center
Abstract
Dispositionalism about belief has had a recent resurgence. In this paper we critically evaluate a popular dispositionalist program pursued by Eric Schwitzgebel. Then we present an alternative: a psychofunctional, representational theory of belief. This theory of belief has two main pillars: that beliefs are relations to structured mental representations, and that the relations are determined by the generalizations under which beliefs are acquired, stored, and changed. We end by describing some of the generalizations regarding belief acquisition, storage, and change.
Keywords Belief  Dispositionalism  Representation  Dissonance  Bias  Inference
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0962-x
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
The Fragmentation of Belief.Joseph Bendana & Eric Mandelbaum - forthcoming - In Cristina Borgoni, Dirk Kindermann & Andrea Onofri (eds.), The Fragmented Mind. Oxford, UK:
Interpretivism and Norms.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):905-930.
Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 22 citations / Add more citations

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