Theory and Decision 83 (3):309-313 (2017)

Authors
John Quiggin
University of Queensland
Abstract
In this note, it is shown that in a Bayesian model with unawareness of impossible, or vanishingly improbable, events, awareness can only change after such an improbable event has actually been observed.
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DOI 10.1007/s11238-016-9580-x
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