Abstract

Recent developments in moral psychology and in evolutionary theories of moral behavior focus on individual and group differences in morality. Moral intuitions may differ depending on sex, age, ecology and evolutionary strategy of the individual. Within the individual, different and mutually incompatible moral intuitions are triggered depending on specific aspects of the situation. Thus there exist interindividual and intraindividual differences in moral intuitions. This diversity of our moral intuitions has led naturalistic and evolutionary ethicists to question normative theories that articulate universal and mutually consistent moral principles. For example, E.O. Wilson has suggested that we cannot impose a single set of moral standards on all human populations or sex-age classes, for this would “create complex, intractable moral dilemmas”. On the other hand, if we are not all in the same game, living together may not work very well, especially if we conceive of moral principles as universally valid. There seems to be a trade-off between moral principles that are intuitively acceptable and moral principles that are universally valid. The literature on naturalistic and evolutionary ethics discusses which implications scientific data can and cannot have on normative questions. I critically apply this discussion to the topic of normative implications of inter- and intraindividual differences in moral intuitions.