Naturalizing the normative and the bridges between 'is' and 'ought"

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5):266 (2011)
Abstract
Elqayam & Evans suggest descriptivism as a way to avoid fallacies and research biases. We argue, first, that descriptive and prescriptive theories might be better off with a closer interaction between and Moreover, while we acknowledge the problematic nature of the discussed fallacies and biases, important aspects of research would be lost through a broad application of descriptivism
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X11000525
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The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse J. Prinz - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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