Analysis 79 (3):461-469 (2019)

Authors
Jake Quilty-Dunn
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
It is an orthodoxy in cognitive science that perception can occur unconsciously. Recently, Hakwan Lau, Megan Peters and Ian Phillips have argued that this orthodoxy may be mistaken. They argue that many purported cases of unconscious perception fail to rule out low degrees of conscious awareness while others fail to establish genuine perception. This paper presents a case of unconscious perception that avoids these problems. It also advances a general principle of ‘phenomenal coherence’ that can insulate some forms of evidence for unconscious perception from the methodological critiques of Lau, Peters and Phillips.
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DOI 10.1093/analys/any022
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
Biosemantics.Ruth Millikan - 1989 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ansgar Beckerman (eds.), Journal of Philosophy. Oxford University Press. pp. 281--297.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
Fuzziness in the Mind: Can Perception Be Unconscious?Henry Taylor - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):383-398.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

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