Theoria 87 (5):1193-1221 (2021)

Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University
David Chalmers’ two-dimensionalism is an ambitious philosophical program that aims to “ground” or “construct” Fregean meanings and restore “the golden triangle” of apriority, necessity, and meaning that Kripke seemingly broke. This paper aims to examine critically what Chalmers’ theory can in reality achieve. It is argued that the theory faces severe challenges. There are some gaps in the overall arguments, and the reasoning is in some places somewhat circular. Chalmers’ theory is effectively founded on certain strong philosophical assumptions. It is concluded that it is unclear whether the theory can deliver all it promises.
Keywords David Chalmers  intensions  propositions  semantics  two-dimensionalism
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Reprint years 2021
DOI 10.1111/theo.12337
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References found in this work BETA

Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1947 - Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Constructing the World.David Chalmers - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de Dicto and de Se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
The Character of Consciousness.David John Chalmers - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
To Be F Is To Be G.Cian Dorr - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):39-134.

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