Deflationism and gödel’s theorem – a comment on Gauker

Analysis 62 (1):85–87 (2002)
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Abstract

In his recent article Christopher Gauker (2001) has presented a thoughtprovoking argument against deflationist theories of truth. More exactly, he attacks what he calls ‘T-schema deflationism’, that is, the claim that a theory of truth can simply take the form of certain instances of the T-schema.

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Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

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References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1):141-62.
VIII.—Truth.Michael Dummett - 1959 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59:141-162.
Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schema.Vann McGee - 1992 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3):235 - 241.

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