Facta Philosophica 4 (1):167-69 (2002)
AbstractStorrs McCall continues the tradition of Lucas and Penrose in an attempt to refute mechanism by appealing to Gödel’s incompleteness theorem. That is, McCall argues that Gödel’s theorem “reveals a sharp dividing line between human and machine thinking”. According to McCall, “[h]uman beings are familiar with the distinction between truth and theoremhood, but Turing machines cannot look beyond their own output”. However, although McCall’s argumentation is slightly more sophisticated than the earlier Gödelian anti-mechanist arguments, in the end it fails badly, as it is at odds with the logical facts
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References found in this work
Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic.Petr Hajék & Pavel Pudlák - 1994 - Studia Logica 53 (3):465-466.
Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic.P. Hájek & P. Pudlák - 2000 - Studia Logica 64 (3):429-430.
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