On Horwich's way out

Analysis 65 (3):175-177 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The minimalist view of truth endorsed by Paul Horwich denies that truth has any underlying nature. According to minimalism, the truth predicate ‘exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need’; ‘the function of the truth predicate is to enable the explicit formulation of schematic generalizations’. Horwich proposes that all there really is to truth follows from the equivalence schema: The proposition that p is true iff p, or, using Horwich’s notation, ·pÒ is true ´ p. The (unproblematic) instances of the schema form ‘the minimal theory of truth’. Horwich claims that all the facts involving truth can be explained on the basis of the minimal theory. However, it has been pointed out, e.g. by Gupta (1993), that the minimal theory is too weak to entail any general facts about truth, e.g. the fact that..

Similar books and articles

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.
Disquotationalism, Minimalism, and the Finite Minimal Theory.Jay Newhard - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):61 - 86.
Formulating deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
Intentionality deflated?Alberto Voltolini - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:117-126.
Theories and Theories of Truth.Ryan Christensen - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43.
Explicating truth: Minimalism and primitivism. [REVIEW]Dirk Greimann - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
Horwich’s Sting: Constitution and Composition.John Collins - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):213-228.
Truth -- Meaning -- Reality.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
912 (#8,470)

6 months
97 (#9,076)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Panu Raatikainen
Tampere University

Citations of this work

Infinite Reasoning.Jared Warren - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):385-407.

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Clarendon Press.
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics.Alfred Tarski - 1956 - Oxford, Clarendon Press.
The concept of truth in formalized languages.Alfred Tarski - 1936 - In A. Tarski (ed.), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford University Press. pp. 152--278.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.

View all 11 references / Add more references