On interpreting Chaitin's incompleteness theorem

Journal of Philosophical Logic 27 (6):569-586 (1998)

Authors
Panu Raatikainen
University of Tampere
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to comprehensively question the validity of the standard way of interpreting Chaitin's famous incompleteness theorem, which says that for every formalized theory of arithmetic there is a finite constant c such that the theory in question cannot prove any particular number to have Kolmogorov complexity larger than c. The received interpretation of theorem claims that the limiting constant is determined by the complexity of the theory itself, which is assumed to be good measure of the strength of the theory. I exhibit certain strong counterexamples and establish conclusively that the received view is false. Moreover, I show that the limiting constants provided by the theorem do not in any way reflect the power of formalized theories, but that the values of these constants are actually determined by the chosen coding of Turing machines, and are thus quite accidental
Keywords algorithmic information theory  incompleteness  Kolmogorov complexity
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1004305315546
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References found in this work BETA

Mathematical Logic.Joseph R. Shoenfield - 1967 - Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley Pub. Co..
Computability and Logic.George S. Boolos, John P. Burgess & Richard C. Jeffrey - 2003 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 9 (4):520-521.
Classical Recursion Theory.Peter G. Hinman - 2001 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (1):71-73.

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Citations of this work BETA

Exploring Randomness.Panu Raatikainen - 2001 - Notices of the AMS 48 (9):992-6.

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