On rules of inference and the meanings of logical constants

Analysis 68 (300):282-287 (2008)
In the theory of meaning, it is common to contrast truth-conditional theories of meaning with theories which identify the meaning of an expression with its use. One rather exact version of the somewhat vague use-theoretic picture is the view that the standard rules of inference determine the meanings of logical constants. Often this idea also functions as a paradigm for more general use-theoretic approaches to meaning. In particular, the idea plays a key role in the anti-realist program of Dummett and his followers. In the theory of truth, a key distinction now is made between substantial theories and minimalist or deflationist views. According to the former, truth is a genuine substantial property of the truth-bearers, whereas according to the latter, truth does not have any deeper essence, but all that can be said about truth is contained in T-sentences (sentences having the form: ‘P’ is true if and only if P). There is no necessary analytic connection between the above theories of meaning and truth, but they have nevertheless some connections. Realists often favour some kind of truth-conditional theory of meaning and a substantial theory of truth (in particular, the correspondence theory). Minimalists and deflationists on truth characteristically advocate the use theory of meaning (e.g. Horwich). Semantical anti-realism (e.g. Dummett, Prawitz) forms an interesting middle case: its starting point is the use theory of meaning, but it usually accepts a substantial view on truth, namely that truth is to be equated with verifiability or warranted assertability. When truth is so understood, it is also possible to accept the idea that meaning is closely related to truth-conditions, and hence the conflict between use theories and truth-conditional theories in a sense disappears in this view
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00754.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Yes and No.I. Rumfitt - 2000 - Mind 109 (436):781-823.
Multiple-Conclusion Logic.D. J. Shoesmith - 1978 - Cambridge University Press.
Rejection.Timothy Smiley - 1996 - Analysis 56 (1):1–9.
The Revival of Rejective Negation.Lloyd Humberstone - 2000 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (4):331-381.
Formalization of Logic.Rudolf Carnap - 1943 - Cambridge: Mass., Harvard University Press.

View all 7 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Inferentializing Semantics.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):255 - 274.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Truth and Meaning.Robert C. Cummins - 2002 - In Joseph Keim-Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press. pp. 175-197.
Truth Theories, Translation Manuals, and Theories of Meaning.Jeff Speaks - 2006 - Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):487 - 505.
Truth-Meaning-Reality.Paul Horwich - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Naïve Truth-Conditions and Meaning.Lionel Shapiro - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):265–277.
Theories and Theories of Truth.Ryan Christensen - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (1):31-43.
Theories of Meaning.Wang Lu - 2008 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 3 (1):83-98.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

154 ( #29,309 of 2,153,857 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

9 ( #76,596 of 2,153,857 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums