Philosophical Issues 19 (1):389-411 (2009)

Wlodek Rabinowicz
Lund University
In “Weighing Lives” (2004) John Broome criticizes a view common to many population axiologists. On that view, population increases with extra people leading decent lives are axiologically neutral: they make the world neither better nor worse, ceteris paribus. Broome argues that this intuition, however, attractive, cannot be sustained, for several independent reasons. I respond to his criticisms and suggest that the neutrality intuition, if correctly interpreted, can after all be defended.On the version I defend,the world with added extra people at wellbeing levels within the neutrality range is incommensurable in value with the world in which these peaople are absent.
Keywords neutrality intuition  population ethics  incommensurability  mere addition paradox  Broome, John  Value relations  utilitarianism  critical level utilitarianism
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DOI 10.1111/j.1533-6077.2009.00174.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Parity.Ruth Chang - 2002 - Ethics 112 (4):659-688.
Moral Problems of Population.Jan Narveson - 1973 - The Monist 57 (1):62-86.

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Citations of this work BETA

An Intrapersonal Addition Paradox.Jacob M. Nebel - 2019 - Ethics 129 (2):309-343.
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The Value of Existence.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Gustaf Arrhenius - 2015 - In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press USA. pp. 424-444.

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