American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):361-370 (2019)

Authors
Gabriel Rabin
New York University, Abu Dhabi
Abstract
I make three claims about the interactions between concept mastery and the knowledge argument. First, I argue that, contra Ball, the concept mastery response to the knowledge argument does not suffer from the heterogeneity of concept mastery. Second, I argue that, when doing metaphysics by relating propositions on the basis of whether a hypothetical agent who knew a base collection could infer a target proposition, it is legitimate to rely on propositions that are not contained in the base, as long as those propositions are required for mastery of relevant concepts. One upshot is that, when checking whether the physical truths a priori entail the consciousness truths, it is fair game to rely on substantive truths about consciousness. Third, I argue that the only version of the knowledge argument that has any hope of succeeding against physicalism completely lacks the argument's driving intuition: that Mary learns something new when she emerges from the black and white room.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 53,666
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.
Mind, Modality, and Meaning: Toward a Rationalist Physicalism.Gabriel Oak Rabin - 2013 - Dissertation, University of California Los Angeles
What Acquaintance Teaches.Alex Grzankowski & Michael Tye - forthcoming - In Thomas Raleigh & Jonathan Knowles (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
Reductive Explanation, Concepts, and a Priori Entailment.E. Diaz-Leon - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (1):99-116.
Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument.Benj Hellie - 2004 - In Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary. MIT Press. pp. 333.
A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument.Torin Alter - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 90 (1):35-56.
Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten.Sam Coleman - 2009 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Recognitional Identification and the Knowledge Argument.Erhan Demircioglu - 2015 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):325-340.
Dissolving Type‐B Physicalism.Helen Yetter-Chappell - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):469-498.
Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary.Sven Walter - 2002 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-10-12

Total views
12 ( #729,767 of 2,349,173 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #148,259 of 2,349,173 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes