Propositions and Multiple Indexing

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):116-124 (2012)
Abstract
It is argued that propositions cannot be the compositional semantic values of sentences (in context) simply due to issues stemming from the compositional semantics of modal operators (or modal quantifiers). In particular, the fact that the arguments for double indexing generalize to multiple indexing exposes a fundamental tension in the default philosophical conception of semantic theory. This provides further motivation for making a distinction between two sentential semantic contents—what (Dummett 1973) called “ingredient sense” and “assertoric content”.
Keywords propositions  multiple indexing  double indexing  two-dimensionalism  operator argument  compositionality  modals  ingredient sense  assertoric content  semantic values
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1002/tht3.16
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,248
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - Oxford University Press, Usa.
Index, Context, and Content.David Lewis - 1980 - In Stig Kanger & Sven Öhman (eds.), Philosophy and Grammar. Reidel. pp. 79-100.
Monsters in Kaplan's Logic of Demonstratives.Brian Rabern - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.

View all 13 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2012-03-20

Total downloads
286 ( #11,562 of 2,192,158 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
8 ( #24,114 of 2,192,158 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature