Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620 (1995)
An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions that create the conflict: Separability of Preferences in the case of sophisticated choice and Reduction to Normal form in the case of resolute choice..
|Keywords||dynamic choice sophisticated choice resolute choice dynamic inconsistency backward induction|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
What Are the Minimal Requirements of Rational Choice? Arguments From the Sequential-Decision Setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.
Money Pumps, Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):60-72.
Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95.
Sequential Decision Making Without Independence: A New Conceptual Approach. [REVIEW]A. Nebout - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (1):85-110.
Similar books and articles
A Theory of Rational Choice Under Ignorance.Klaus Nehring - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (3):205-240.
Revealed Preference and Expected Utility.Stephen A. Clark - 2000 - Theory and Decision 49 (2):159-174.
Testing the Effects of Similarity on Risky Choice: Implications for Violations of Expected Utility.David E. Buschena & David Zilberman - 1999 - Theory and Decision 46 (3):253-280.
Preference Stability and Substitution of Indifferents: A Rejoinder to Seidenfeld.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2000 - Theory and Decision 48 (4):311-318.
On Seidenfeldâs Criticism of Sophisticated Violations of the Independence Axiom.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (3):279-292.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads66 ( #78,448 of 2,158,273 )
Recent downloads (6 months)11 ( #32,227 of 2,158,273 )
How can I increase my downloads?