To have one's cake and eat it, too: Sequential choice and expected-utility violations

Journal of Philosophy 92 (11):586-620 (1995)
Abstract
An agent whose preferences violate the Independence Axiom or for some other reason are not representable by an expected utility function, can avoid 'dynamic inconsistency' either by foresight ('sophisticated choice') or by subsequent adjustment of preferences to the chosen plan of action ('resolute choice'). Contrary to McClennen and Machina, among others, it is argued these two seemingly conflicting approaches to 'dynamic rationality' need not be incompatible. 'Wise choice' reconciles foresight with a possibility of preference adjustment by rejecting the two assumptions that create the conflict: Separability of Preferences in the case of sophisticated choice and Reduction to Normal form in the case of resolute choice..
Keywords dynamic choice  sophisticated choice  resolute choice  dynamic inconsistency  backward induction
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DOI jphil199592117
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Pragmatic Rationality and Rules.Edward F. Mcclennen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):210-258.
Money Pumps, Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):60-72.

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