Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (4):349-379 (2016)

Authors
Brian Rabern
University of Edinburgh
Gabriel Rabin
New York University, Abu Dhabi
Abstract
Those who wish to claim that all facts about grounding are themselves grounded (“the meta-grounding thesis”) must defend against the charge that such a claim leads to infinite regress and violates the well-foundedness of ground. In this paper, we defend. First, we explore three distinct but related notions of “well-founded”, which are often conflated, and three corresponding notions of infinite regress. We explore the entailment relations between these notions. We conclude that the meta-grounding thesis need not lead to tension with any of the three notions of “well-founded”. Finally, we explore the details of and motivations for further conditions on ground that one might add to generate a conflict between the meta-grounding thesis and a well-founded constraint. We explore these topics by developing and utilizing a formal framework based on the notion of a grounding structure.
Keywords Ground  Metaphysical dependence  Well-founded  Infinite regress  Foundationalism  Grounding structure
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-015-9376-4
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References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford University Press.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Guide to Ground.Kit Fine - 2012 - In Fabrice Correia & Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 37--80.
Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction.Gideon Rosen - 2010 - In Bob Hale & Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 109-36.
The Possibility of Physicalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (9-10):557-592.

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Citations of this work BETA

Social Construction and Grounding.Aaron M. Griffith - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):393-409.
Ground Grounded.Theodore Sider - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (3):747-767.
Could a Middle Level Be the Most Fundamental?Sara Bernstein - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-14.
Fundamentality.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

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