Tópicos 43:25-50 (2012)
In this article, I develop an Aristotelian account of akrasia as a primary failure of intentional agency in contrast to a phenomenon I refer to as ‘ordinary weakness of will’: I argue that ordinary weakness of will is best understood as a secondary failure of intentional agency, that to tackle akrasia.
|Keywords||akrasia weakness of will inverse akrasia practical syllogism Aristotle blame agential failure planning|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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