In Lubomira Radoilska (ed.), Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 252-280 (2012)
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Abstract |
In this chapter, I articulate the structure of a general concept of autonomy and then reply to possible objections with reference to Ulysses arrangements in psychiatry. The line of argument is as follows. Firstly, I examine three alternative conceptions of autonomy: value-neutral, value-laden, and relational. Secondly, I identify two paradigm cases of autonomy and offer a sketch of its concept as opposed to the closely related freedom of action and intentional agency. Finally, I explain away the autonomy paradox, to which the previously identified pair of paradigm cases seems to give rise in the context of mental disorder. By addressing this paradox, we learn two valuable lessons. The first is about the relationships between the three conceptions of autonomy above. The second is about the relationship between autonomy and mental disorder.
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Keywords | autonomy mental disorder Ulysses arrangement intentional agency freedom of action choice agential success reasons and values |
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References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge.Richard Moran - 2001 - Princeton University Press.
The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1988 - Cambridge University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Autonomy, Rationality, and Contemporary Bioethics.Jonathan Pugh - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Emotion and Value in the Evaluation of Medical Decision-Making Capacity: A Narrative Review of Arguments.Helena Hermann, Manuel Trachsel, Bernice S. Elger & Nikola Biller-Andorno - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
Autonomy and Depression.Lubomira Radoilska - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davis, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychiatry. Oxford University Press. pp. 1155-1170.
Akrasia and Ordinary Weakness of Will.Lubomira V. Radoilska - 2012 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 43:25-50.
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