In Autonomy and Mental Disorder. Oxford University Press. pp. 252-280 (2012)
In this chapter, I articulate the structure of a general concept of autonomy and then reply to possible objections with reference to Ulysses arrangements in psychiatry. The line of argument is as follows. Firstly, I examine three alternative conceptions of autonomy: value-neutral, value-laden, and relational. Secondly, I identify two paradigm cases of autonomy and offer a sketch of its concept as opposed to the closely related freedom of action and intentional agency. Finally, I explain away the autonomy paradox, to which the previously identified pair of paradigm cases seems to give rise in the context of mental disorder. By addressing this paradox, we learn two valuable lessons. The first is about the relationships between the three conceptions of autonomy above. The second is about the relationship between autonomy and mental disorder.
|Keywords||autonomy mental disorder Ulysses arrangement intentional agency freedom of action choice agential success reasons and values|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Emotion and Value in the Evaluation of Medical Decision-Making Capacity: A Narrative Review of Arguments.Helena Hermann, Manuel Trachsel, Bernice S. Elger & Nikola Biller-Andorno - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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