A Normative Regress Problem

American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1):35-47 (1999)
Abstract
The article argues that theorists who try to justify 'ought'-claims, i.e., who try to show that a standard of behavior has normative authority, will run into a regress problem. The problem is similar in structure to the familiar regress in the justification of belief. The point of the paper is not skeptical. Rather, the aim is to help theorists better understand the challenges associated with formulating a theory of normative authority.
Keywords justification  normativity  regress problem  normative authority  norms
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Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):451-470.
Norm-Expressivism and Regress.Tanyi Attila - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):362-376.

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