Heuristics and the generalized correspondence principle


Authors
Hans Radder
VU University Amsterdam
Abstract
Several philosophers of science have claimed that the correspondence principle can be generalized from quantum physics to all of (particularly physical) science and that in fact it constitutes one of the major heuristical rules for the construction of new theories. In order to evaluate these claims, first the use of the correspondence principle in (the genesis of) quantum mechanics will be examined in detail. It is concluded from this and from other examples in the history of science that the principle should be qualified with respect to its nature and relativized with respect to its scope of application. At the same time this conclusion implies a qualification and a relativization of the heuristic power of the principle. Generally speaking, intertheoretical correspondence is primarily of a formal-mathematical and empirical but not of a conceptual nature. Moreover, it only applies to certain parts of the theories involved. Finally, a number of philosophical justifications of the principle are discussed and some conclusions are drawn concerning the debates on theory reduction and on the discovery-justification distinction.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/bjps/42.2.195
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 40,665
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
How the Laws of Physics Lie.Nancy Cartwright - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):478-480.
The Structure of Science.Ernest Nagel - 1961 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):275-275.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 17 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
223 ( #27,657 of 2,242,427 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
2 ( #815,164 of 2,242,427 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature