Hume on Motivating Sentiments, the General Point of View, and the Inculcation of "Morality"

Hume Studies 20 (1):37-58 (1994)
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That Hume 's theory can be interpreted in two widely divergent ways-as a version of sentimentalism and as an ideal observer theory-is symptomatic of a puzzle ensconced in Hume 's theory. How can the ground of morality be internal and motivating when an inference to the feelings of a spectator in "the general point of view" is typically necessary to get to genuine moral distinctions? This paper considers and rejects the suggestion that in moral education, for Hume, the inculcation of morality internalizes the sentiments of the ideal observer. It ultimately offers a different resolution of the conflicting strains



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Citations of this work

The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.
Hume's and Smith's Partial Sympathies and Impartial Stances.Jon Rick - 2007 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (2):135-158.
Correcting Our Sentiments about Hume's Moral Point of View.Kate Abramson - 1999 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (3):333-361.
Reid's Non-Humean Theory of Moral Motives.Esther Engels Kroeker - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):205-224.

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The Moral Point of View.Carole Stewart - 1976 - Philosophy 51 (196):177 - 187.

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